The Military in New Mexico
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel George A. McCall, 4th US Infantry

Inspector General's Office, Philadelphia, 26 December 1850

General:-In obedience to instructions from the War Department, embraced in a letter from your office, dated the 24th of June, 1850, I have now the honor to submit a report on the several subjects therein referred to, viz.:

"1. The probable number of lives lost and of persons taken captives by the Indians, within the last eighteen months, in New Mexico; also the probable value of property stolen or destroyed within the same period."

In pursuing my inquiries on this subject, I found it extremely difficult, although I visited towns or settlements where, or in the neighborhood of which, depredations had been committed by the Navajoes, Utahs, or Apaches within twelve or eighteen months previous, to collect from the people information at all explicit or reliable; while the cases reported at the headquarters of the department, or the office of the Secretary of State, do not cover two-thirds, perhaps not one-half, of all that occurred. However, on the northern frontier, from Abiquiu to Las Vegas, there were enumerated to me about fifty-three persons who have been killed on that line within twelve months, from September 1, 1849, to September 1, 1850. In the six months preceding, there were some shepherds killed at different points along that line, probably ten or twelve, though I could not arrive at the number with any precision. These murders were committed by the Navajoes, Utahs, and Jicarilla Apaches, but principally by the latter. In the lower country, and along the Rio Grande, from Santa Fé to El Paso, about twenty persons have been killed within eighteen months; these were by the Navajoes, and White Mountain and Sacramento Mountain Apaches. The number of captives carried off from New Mexico within the same period, amount in all to thirteen that are known and enumerated. The probability, however, is that, many obscure persons have been killed and children carried off, besides those named.

If we assume the total ascertained of killed to be eighty-three, and of captives to be thirteen, I incline to the belief that from fifteen to thirty per cent might be safely added to these figures without exceeding the truth.

As far as I could ascertain positively, by summing up individual cases, the number of animals driven off by these Indians within eighteen months prior to the 1st of September, 1850, is as follows:

Horses	181, which, at $40 each, is	$ 7,240
Mules	402, which, at $50 each, is	20,100
Horned cattle	(many of them work oxen,) 788, at $20	15,760
Sheep	47,300, at $1.50	70,950
Total		$114,050

To this amount fifty per cent may be added. And when it is taken into consideration, that for twenty years past, the flocks and herds of this people have been yearly diminishing under the constant ravages of the wild tribes and that districts which formerly were covered with "stock" are now almost bare, the above amounts must be set down as heavy losses. For further information on this point, I beg leave to refer to my report of the 15th of July last, now on file at the Department.

"2. The capacity of the people of New Mexico to resist the incursions of the Indians, and the necessary military force to secure protection."

With regard to the first clause of the inquiry, the history of the country during the period of two hundred years past illustrates the fact which impresses itself on every one who visits New Mexico, that the people within themselves are altogether incapable of resisting the inroads of the Indians into the very heart of their territory. They have been from generation to generation so deeply imbued with the fear of their savage neighbors, that it is only necessary to raise the cry of "los Indios," and a dozen of them will run from a couple of Apaches armed with lance and bow. On several expeditions against these Indians they have been organized into companies, and have marched with the regular troops; but their chief exploits have been to secure the booty, after the enemy had been attacked and routed by the Regulars. In most of these instances, they have been allowed, as an encouragement, to possess themselves of the entire spoil; but while this continues to be their sole object, as it does now seem to be, they will not greatly expose their persons in the conflict; and I should therefore rate their capacity for Indian warfare at very little above "zero."

Better auxiliaries may be found in the Pueblo (or civilized) Indians of the Territory; and I would here respectfully repeat what I had the hoor to present to the notice of the Department in my report of the 15th of July, viz., that advantages may accrue from extending to these people a marked kindness, and securing their confidence in the friendship and justice of our Government.

In replying to the latter clause of the second query, I would in the first place beg leave to invite attention to the facts stated in a preceding paragraph, i.e. the known losses sustained yearly and monthly by the inhabitants of this Territory from the inroads of large tribes of wild Indians, whose country envelops the Territory without interval on the north, south, east, and west. From the facts to which I refer, it must appear either that the military force at present in New Mexico is idle and inefficient, or that the extent of frontier intrusted to its protection is out of proportion to its strength and the character of its organization.

A single glance at the map, and a reference to the total number of troops for duty, as stated in the last report from the ninth department headquarters, will clearly demonstrate the truth of the last position. The question is, what (at the lowest calculation) is "the necessary military force to secure protection?"

In stationing a military force here, there are, apparently, two objects in view, requiring separate fields of action. The first is to afford present protection to the lives and property of the inhabitants; the second, to effectually check the marauding spirit of the Indians, and, at a subsequent period, to induce them to dwell in fixed habitations, to cultivate the soil to some extent, and to raise their own stock. The first must be effected, as far as practicable, by stationing small bodies of troops in the principal settlements. The second can only be accomplished by the permanent establishment of a strong force within the Indian country. To do this, I should answer that, for present service, the lowest figure at which this force can be put is 2200 (two thousand two hundred) effective men; of whom, at least, 1400 (fourteen hundred) should be mounted.

The question may, perhaps, be more satisfactorily answered by an illustration of the mode of warfare and pillage pursued by the Indians against whom the troops are to act, and a description of the country in which they are to operate, premising that the tribes above named (independently of the Comanches) count from four thousand five hundred to five thousand warriors. If we take Santa Fé, the seat of government and principal depot of munitions, as the central point, then the northern line of posts, for defence or protection, may be drawn through Abiquiu, on the northwest; Taos, Rayado, and Mora, on the north, to Las Vegas on the north-east. These are all important and thriving settlements; but each one is separated from the next by rugged mountain regions of from twenty to forty-five miles in width, running back into the Indian country, and thus affording from the latter easy and concealed approaches on the flanks of all of them. For the protection of life, of the crops, of the working animals, and all property immediately around the homesteads of these people, a small force at each of the points named is considered sufficient. But the principal wealth of the people is in their flocks and herds; and these must be sent (particularly in winter) into narrow mountain glades, affording fine pasturage, at the distance of from five to twenty-five miles from the settlements, where they are left for months at a time under charge of a few simple and unarmed shepherds. Here they are an easy prey to the Utahs and Jicarilla Apaches, who, crawling upon the listless shepherds, shoot them with arrows to prevent their carrying information, and then drive off the stock with impunity; or, if a shepherd, escaping, brings intelligence to the nearest military post, experience has shown that the pursuit is almost always fruitless.

The other line of settlement that should be occupied, is from Santa Fé southward, along the valley of the Rio Grande, to El Paso. Here small garrisons at Albuquerque, (or Bernallio,) Cibolletta, Socorro, (or twenty-seven miles below, opposite Valverde,) Don' Aña, and El Paso, (or San Elizario,) would, in the same way, give security to the homesteads, but nothing more. The only way in which a military force can be advantageously and effectively employed to put an end to Indian spoliations in New Mexico, is to post them, not in our settlements, or on our borders, but in the heart of the Indian country. And here they must be in sufficient strength to awe the Indians-to punish them in their strongholds for the offences they commit beyond their own boundaries. Three stations of this kind are deemed requisite, viz.: one in the Navajoe country, near the cañon of Chi; one in the Apache country east, somewhere on the eastern slope of the Sacramento Mountains, where water, grass, and timber, of excellent quality, may be found; and one in the south on the Gila River, or near the old copper mines. The latter is a very eligible position. It is a high country, with pure air, and possessing all the requisites for the establishment of a military post, together with abundance of game. At the first two posts there should be from four hundred and fifty to five hundred men each; at the last, three hundred and fifty. At most of the other points named above, a single company would be sufficient.

On completing the tour of the military posts in this Territory, it appears to me that the following would be a proper disposition of the troops at this time:

Owing to the usual casualties of service, I do not consider that the average effective strength of companies can be safely estimated at more than seventy-five total.

The above total present in New Mexico on the 30th of September last, viz., nine hundred and eighty-seven, would give only an average of fifty-two total to a company. Say, then, that each company is filled to seventy-five total, there will be

Thus, one regiment of mounted riflemen in addition to the force now in New Mexico, may be considered a sufficient or necessary military force to secure protection; but this is placing it at the very lowest figure at which it can safely be put.

Tha nature of the service in this country requires mounted troops almost exclusively; the distribution of supplies and munitions from the general depots to the frontier posts, the frequent visits of staff officers (paymasters, quartermasters, etc.) from post to post in the necessary discharge of their duties, the transmittal of orders and reports of constant occurrence in the usual course of service, all require mounted escorts or express riders.

The law authorizing the mounting of a portion of the infantry regiments would in some measure supply the deficiency of cavalry in the organization of the army, but there are many objections to this. One alone it is sufficient to cite, viz., the increased expense. This my own observation satisfies me will be the result in a few years of the adoption of this system. A better one, I believe, would be to change the organization of one or two of the foot regiments and convert them into mounted riflemen.

Among the advantages of adopting this course in preference to raising new regiments, the following may be named:-The officers of the infantry in general, particularly from the rank of captain descending, are fine horsemen. Their lives are passed almost entirely on the frontiers: hunting is a favorite recreation with them, and a majority of them keep their own horses; they are consequently good judges of horses, and well skilled in every respect in their management and treatment. They would, therefore, become at once capable and efficient cavalry officers, for they are already well grounded in the tactics. Again, the experience of twenty-five years has shown me that on an average about one half the infantry soldiers are more or less accustomed to horses, and would be at least on an equality with dragoon recruits in all that regards the horse. The remainder, with some exceptions, (who might be transferred to other foot regiments,) would in a few months manage their horses sufficiently well for all service on this frontier; whereas they would possess over any newly-organized regiments the all-important qualifications of discipline and a knowledge of the use of their arms.

I advance, General, for the consideration of the Department, the proposition to change the organization of one or two of the foot regiments; not as an expedient to remove the necessity so loudly calling for an addition to the army of one or more new regiments of dragoons or mounted riflemen, but because I am persuaded that the nature of the service to be required of the army for the next ten years will be such as to require that the cavalry arm shall greatly predominate in it organization.

"3. The best means of supplying the troops in New Mexico with recruits, horses, and subsistence."

In order to keep the companies in New Mexico full at the present standard, recruiting in the Atlantic and Middle States must be chiefly depended upon; re-enlistment will do but little towards it.

While in this Territory, my attention was requested by an officer of the medical department to the subject of the enlistment of hospital stewards especially for that office; and I have pleasure in submitting his views, viz., that they should be enlisted or employed especially for that duty; that their pay should be increased to that of paymaster's clerk. The advantages would be, that they would only be removed from the hospital at the expiration of their service; that the hazard incurred in putting men whose previous education has not fitted them for the duty into the hospital is very great; and that by the course recommended, the Government would save largely in men, as well as in medicines and hospital stores; that the increased pay proposed would bring into the service graduates of the schools of pharmacy of good character.

With respect to horses, they cannot be procured of sufficient size and strength in the Territory. It will, therefore, be necessary to purchase in the Middle States. But the horses from Missouri and Illinois, from which States most of the horses now in the Territory have been brought, are not found to stand the change of climate as well as those from a lower and more temperate latitude, as Tennessee and Kentucky. All horses, however, even from the last-named States, experience more or less the ill with subsistence I had the honor to report on the 14th instant. I would only further add, that it was remarked to me by Captain Bowman, regimental quartermaster of the third infantry, and acting assistant commissary of subsistence at El Paso, that much expense in transporting subsistence across the plains was incurred by packing bacon, hard bread, &c., in barrels; the bacon sides being cut into square pieces (the bones were not removed) left large interstices in the barrels, and these again leave intervals in the wagon bodies, by which much space is lost. He recommended that square boxes of convenient size, and made to fit in the wagon bodies, be used instead of barrels; also that hard bread be baked in square cakes, and be packed in similar boxes. I examined the weight of some of the barrels (whisky-barrels) used for bread, and found they ranged from forty-five to fifty-six pounds, while the hard bread contained did not exceed from ninety to one hundred and twelve pounds. Boxes would be lighter than these barrels, but it is questionable whether the bread would be as well preserved.

There is no reason, however, why all the hard bread required for use in New Mexico should not be made there, and for this purpose it would be well to send out one or two competent bakers.

"4. The probable number of inhabitants of New Mexico-Americans, Mexicans, and Pueblo Indians; also the number of each class within its limits whilst a territory of Mexico."

I have answered this query in my report of the 15th July last as fully, I believe, as I could possibly now, by going over the same ground again.

George A. McCall. Letters From the Frontiers. (1868), pp. 526-535.