Call for Military Reform
Lieutenant-Colonel William Duane, USA

1810

Nothing more plainly shews the misconception which generally prevails, especially in the legislatures of the Union and the several states, than the contradictory motives which are assigned for leaving the militia and military system in their present state of disorganization. Some plead that the art of war is laid down in Steuben; others that Steuben carried us through the revolution; when in fact both Burgoyne and Cornwallis were taken before Steuben's tract was introduced; others are for arming our militia with pikes alone, forgetting that an open country is that for which pikes are best adapted; and that to render pikes effective there must be a most perfect discipline of manoeuvre, which may render the line as potent and firm as the column, and as easily displayed, concentrated, and formed to various fronts as the best disciplined infantry; when the new modes of movement are mentioned, they are called novelties, though the principal of them are as old as the battle of Pharsalia, and were in practice at the battle of Lutzen; other exceptions are, that besides being new, the modern discipline is too difficult to learn, too perplexed and fatiguing; that the multiplied manoeuvres require more time and labor, and must be in a great measure useless; and that so satisfied are the British of this that they have reduced them all to nineteen manoeuvres. Nothing so truly depicts the want of judgment or a proper attention to the subject, as observations like these....the truth is that the modern principles of instruction are fewer in number, more easily taught and understood, and less irksome to the soldier; better adapted to engage the soldier's attention and afford him gratification; that the variety and number of evolutions is not more various than the eternal variety of ground by which military movements and dispositions are always governed; ant that the new discipline, by teaching the first elements well, enables the military body to be moved by these principles on any ground, and not only to form any disposition that it is possible to form, but without having been previously formed in such new dispositions; the elementary principles of modern discipline being peculiarly adapted to the understanding, and the movements by small bodies, enabling every officer of a small portion of troops to move his particular corps by the mode best adapted to the ground.

It must always be the fault of the government if its military institutions are erroneous. If there were but a single regiment, that should be instructed according to the best principles, and made to practise whatever was most useful and necessary in the art of war. In a nation of freemen the regular force should constantly exhibit their exercises and evolutions, so that every citizen should be familiar with the best practice of the use of arms and of manoeuvres. The eye may be said to have an infallible memory, it is above all other of the organs of sense the best medium of intelligence. The United States troops are usually cooped up in garrisons, as if they were, like the king of Prussia, forming a system in secret, while in fact there is nothing worthy of the name of discipline carried on, and in too many instances nothing understood. Perhaps the troops of the United States have not, as a part of discipline, fired a ball at a target for twenty years. Field artillery, or mortar practice, probably not more frequent. The maxim of economy is an important one in a free state, but there is an economy more destructive than the greatest profusion; and that is the economy of practical and useful knowledge.

We speak of these things reluctantly, but the evil is almost a disease, and requires the regard of the intelligent men in all parts of the nation.

What is then requisite for the United States?

It will be said that there is some difficulty in effecting any improvement. Unquestionably so it is, and so it ever will be. But the government is bound not to regard difficulties, when they are put in competition with the dangers which may flow from neglect. The government possesses the power, and the army is bound, and the country is anxious to possess a more complete system in lieu of the once useful but at present useless tract of baron Steuben. The difficulties are not so great as may be at first sight supposed, and may be surmounted in a way rather to serve as a pleasure than a difficulty to the army and militia. The elements of modern exercise might be first introduced, they are neither so numerous, so perplexed, nor so unnatural as the old forms; neither are they so tiresome to the teacher or the taught. They have also another advantage, that the soldier is not as heretofore stiffened and set up like an embalmed Egyptian mummy; the modern method takes any number from 10 to 100 men, and places them in an easy position erect without constraint of head, or limbs, or body; and proceeds by familiarizing the ear to equal time by the action of the feet of the whole squad or company; after which they are all taught to face to either hand or about, indifferently, and never in one routine; the mode of moving the limbs and the time of movement is ever the same; and the words of command few, simple, and plain; where they in any case differ from the usual words of common life the teacher's duty is to explain them often, until the ears of all are familiar with their practical meaning.

The next process is advancing, at a given length of pace in equal times; and this is combined with facings, and at last with wheelings, in whole ranks, or in sections of any given numbers, always varying, diminishing, and augmenting at discretion the numbers of the sections, by drawing from the right of each successive section in the rear of the first, to the left of the leading section, a number sufficient to augment the first to the number required, and so of every section from front to rear; the drill is thus carried on always with moving feet at the time of gay dancing music, and when marching always at a pace of 24 inches.

After the squad of 20 or 100 is found complete in these minute branches of marking time, advancing at time, facing and wheeling, augmenting and diminishing sections, they are taught the oblique wheelings and facings, or as the modern words are half or quarter facing, or half or quarter wheeling; and to march dressed in these several orders, so as to form exactly in the same relative position to each other when wheeled or faced to their primitive position.

Thus much may be well taught, and comprehended, and practised in two or three weeks, employing only two or three hours at each drill, and twice each day.

The instruction of the pivots or flank men of ranks and sections, go along with the first wheelings; and as soon as the uses of the pivots are generally understood, then the whole are formed into double ranks; and the men are prepared to execute any of the modern evolutions or manoeuvres; it being always calculated that the officers are equally diligent and as well drilled as the men, and competent not only to comprehend but to correct an error when it occurs.

At this stage, and not before, arms should be put into their hands; and a manual exercise of some kind taught, for it is not material what the motions are so that the firing and loading motions are taught to be performed with dexterity and ease. The drill is then manoeuvred once a day with arms, and the officer who feels a proper sense of the importance of the habit of command, and the advantage of giving troops the practice of movement, will diversify his own pleasures and gratify his men, by moving them into all the various positions of column, line, echellons, movements by heads of sections, changing flanks and fronts, taking new alignments, countermarching in the various modes of which modern military works furnish such useful and abundant examples.

The elements of the first drills with minute instructions might be comprised in a hand book of one half the compass of Steuben's tract; and this elementary work placed in the hands of all descriptions of troops, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, should be the first rule of practice for them all in common. This introduced, the government could at leisure prepare instructions for a more comprehensive course of manoeuvres, and particularly hand books upon the same simple principles of drills for artillery, riflemen, and cavalry, in their particular branches of duty. It being to be understood as a fundamental principle, that as the movements and action of all kinds of troops are regulated by the movements of infantry; or in other words, as infantry compose the main body, line, or column; the rifelemen, artillery, and cavalry must be governed in their movements by the main body, to which they are appendages or auxiliaries; and it is therefore required that they should know themselves how to execute the infantry manoeuvres, in order that they should not, like the French at Rosbach, be confounded by movements of which they are ignorant.

The profound mathematician may look down from the elevation of abstract science upon the cold common place of syllabic combination and Arabic numerical notation; but he owes his first knowledge to the alphabet of language and arithmetic; here he must have begun, and here the military man of whatever grade must also begin. He must learn the alphabet of military knowledge at the drill, he must take his lessons and learn them; he must study and practice what he has learned there, in order to teach; and the officer must learn both to command others and to obey. There is no science which may not be attained by earnest application and practice. But no science or art can be acquired or understood without both; and the more carefully that study is pursued and the more frequently it is practised, the more efficient will it be in the individual and in the regular mass of individuals. But practice is above all requisite, careful, frequent, constant, obstinately pursued practice.

But this is not yet a system.

We have exhibited the elementary branch of military instruction first, merely because it is the point at which every military body must commence; because this is what is now most wanted, and because while it is carrying into practical use, the general system containing all the purposes and uses of an efficient military establishment may in the mean time be prepared and digested.

Having treated so much on this subject, its importance will exuse the discussion of it more at large. To the perfection of a military establishment for the U. States two things are essential.

The first is, that it should be such as to be equally applicable in its operation to the militia and to the army of the U. States, whenever the former are called forth.

The second, that every act and duty appertaining to the military establishment should be transacted by none other than men subject to military order, control, and responsibility; and liable to be put in motion or brought to account for delay or neglect in a military manner.

These two principles lead to the consideration of what would be an efficient military organization; and here we have a host of formidable enemies, ignorance, a disorderly mass; indolence and idleness, hanging on the flanks; the steady habits of old prejudice ever alarmed for its patronage or its place; all immediately exclaim, would there not be great confusion produced by abrogating some duties and introducing others. We shall not skirmish with this motley and unmilitary groupe; we shall come to the point. In considering the subject, it will be found that the present war department in fact corresponds with what is called the general staff in other countries; the president representing the commander in chief, the secretary at war chief of staff. From this fact it will be perceived, that whatever improvements might take place in the system, it would at first consist only of defining and distributing the duties and details of service by the war department.

After defining and arranging the various heads of service, they should of course be classed according to analogy or the dependency of one kind upon another; so that there would be several heads, under each of which the inferior branches of duty might be distributed. At the head of one of the superior branches should be placed a responsible officer, who would have the superintendance of all the duties, and the direction and control of all those placed in the execution of the subordinate branches; this officer to be responsible to the executive directly in peace; and when the arrangements became necessarily distinct in the field, to become responsible to the commanding officer in the field. These heads of branches should be the efficient staff of the military institution, it is through the perfection of the organization of the staff, and the rigid responsibility for the due execution and for seeing all under them duly performed, that modern tactics is in an eminent degree indebted for its preeminency and its triumphs. Precision, promptitude, and provident foresight, are their invariable laws, and upon these being perfect depends all the success of modern military science; but it must be taken in connexion also with the disciplinary principles which go into action, where the same provident foresight, the same precision, and the same celerity of motion ensure success to all that is undertaken against any force, however numerous and brave, destitute orf a system equally provident and combined in its operations.

To commence an efficient system we must take the outline upon the largest scale; that is, in preparing an establishment, of which the end is the defence of all the nation, we must not begin with a system which is only adapted to a peace; an assumption of this kind would render any military system nugatory. To form a system complete, it must be founded in its very nature on the supposition of an actual war. This would no doubt be reversing the present order of things; since it is not to be concealed, that as it is at present constituted, the war department is utterly incompetent to conduct a war; but such as would leave the mind of a general officer, in case of actual war, to labor under a most hazardous and perplexing responsibility. Possibly economy may here take the alarm, we shall quiet this costly chimera.

A peace establishment of the military department we conceive should be treated as the incident; forming and fixing the principles of the institution would not necessarily call for its immediate completion, or the appointment even of a single officer, or the expenditure of a single dollar more than at present; the duties and functions should be defined, but no additional officers employed until occasion called for them, that is war. It is necessary to offer these precautionary ideas to prevent misapprehension, and lest the idea of the formation of a system, that is a coherent and comprehensive regulation for the military department, should be mistaken for a wish to immediately organize an army and staff, and put them into pay. It is barely meant that during peace provision should be made against war, which we do not know how soon we may be involved in.... we shall therefore proceed.

The military system may be said to consist of two principal branches, military operations, and subsistence, both of which must be within the full and ample command of the chief of an army. These two branches become the objects of duty distributed among the staff; which unfolds another important truth, that every officer who has the provision, or charge of procuring supplies of subsistence or clothing, should be responsible in a military manner for the execution of his duty, and liable to military penalties for the abuse or the neglect of that duty. This is a most important consideration; and it is apprehended the scandalous state of the clothing of the army of the U. States, which has been gradually becoming worse for several years past, is a strong exemplification of this necessity. There should not be a single officer of the war department, unless perhaps the accounting officers, who should be exempt from military control, in order to assure a due exercise of their duty between the public and the military establishment; as it would be in the power of men intrusted with the provision of clothing or subsistence at any time....to betray the army to an enemy.

The beginning should be with the organization of the general staff, and this should be adapted, for the reasons given, to a state of war. The secretary of the war department being in fact the chief of the staff, the rest of the staff should consist of an able practical general officer, a capable chief officer of the artillery, an effective chief officer of the engineers, a vigilant and experienced quarter-master general, and an intelligent and experienced adjutant general, with one or two commissioned officers, as the service might require, attached to each of these several officers as aids, who should execute under a board of war the details of duty; these superior officers, with others called in, should constitute this council or board for the regulation of all the military details; appoint inspectors of reviews, and such other persons as might be required to aid in the service, such as surgeons, draftsmen, &c. They should divide their duties into the military and the administrative, and have cognizance and control over every branch, always subject to the chief of the staff or secretary at war; they should assemble and deliberate, and their consultations and measures, however minute, with their reasonings or objections, should be daily recorded; and these consultations should, whenever required, be presented to the secretary at war, to the president, or to congress when called for.

The military branch should be distributed under the heads following....

Such is the outline of a military system adapted to the circumstances and necessities of the U. States. On a superficial glance, to timid or unreflecting men, this may appear to be surrounded with difficulties insuperable; there will be discordant opinions, envy, jealousy, folly will devise objections; no two men may concur, however equal and able; the objects are themselves too numerous and complex for any one man to prepare in time or in a satisfactory manner; the proposition itself will be said to arise from interested motives; from some lust of place or profit; it will require resolution to resist prejudice; and the requisite firmness to decide may not be found.

We shall close this part of our essay by stating generally, that whenever there shall appear a disposition to adopt this or any such system, means can be pointed out by which the insuperable difficulties shall be made appear easy to be overcome; discordant opinions reconciled and brought spontaneously to concurrence; envy, folly, and jealousy will be allowed to prey upon themselves, without danger of annoyance to the plan; the variety of the objects can be made subservient to render them more simple, practicable, and effective; and instead of the merit being ascribed to any one man, every officer in the army and the militia if they choose shall have an opportunity of laying his claim to a participation in the plan.

If the observations thrown out in this preface are well founded, the necessity of a work of this kind will be immediately perceived. Let it not however be imagined, says major James, that a Military Dictionary ought exclusively to belong to a camp or barrack, or be found in the closets or libraries of military men alone. The arts and sciences are so intimately connected together, that they eventually borrow language and resources from each other, and go hand in hand from the senate to the field, from the pulpit to the bar, and from the desk of the historian to the bureau of the statesman or politician....

William Duane. Military Dictionary, or, Explanation of the Several Systems of Discipline of Different Kinds of Troops, Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry; The Principles of Fortification, and All the Modern Improvements in the Science of Tactics: Comprising the Pocket Gunner, or Little Bombardier; The Military Regulations of the United States; The Weights, Measures, and Monies of all Nations; The Technical Terms and Phrases of the Art of War in the French Language. Particularly Adapted to the Use of the Military Institutions of the United States. (Philadelphia: 1810), pp. vii-xi.