- by not encamping too near a wood or forest, unless sufficient reason require it.
- by calling the roll frequently every day.
- by often sending out patrols of hussars to scour the country round about the camp.
- by placing chasseurs in the corn by night and doubling the cavalry posts at dusk to strengthen the chain.
- by not allowing the soldiers to wander about and taking care that each troop be led regularly to water and to forage by an officer.
- by punishing all marauding with severity, as it gives rise to every species of disorder and irregularity.
- by not drawing in the guards, who are placed in the villages on marching days, until the troops are under arms.
- by forbidding, under strictest injunctions, that any soldier on a march quit his rank or his division.
- by avoiding night marches, unless obliged by necessity.
- by pushing forward patrols of hussars to the right and left, while the infantry are passing through a wood.
- by placing officers at each end of a defile, to oblige the soldiers to fall into their proper places.
- by concealing from the soldier any retrograde movement which you may be obliged to make, or giving some specious, flattering pretext for so doing.
- by paying great attention to the regular issue of necessary subsistence, and taking care that the troops be furnished with bread, meat, beer, brandy, etc.
- by searching for the cause of the evil, when desertion shall have crept into a regiment or company, inquiring if the soldier has received his bounty and other customary indulgencies, and if there has been no misconduct on the part of the captain. No relaxation of discipline is however on any account to be permitted. It may be said that the colonel will take care of this business, but his efforts alone cannot be sufficient, for in an army, every individual part of it should aim at perfection, to make it appear to be the work of only one man.
Particular Instructions for His Officers
Frederick the Great
1753
Of Prussian Troops, Their Excellencies, and Their Defects
The strictest care and the most unremitting attention are required of commanding officers in the formation of my troops. The most exact discipline is ever to be maintained, and the greatest regard paid to their welfare; they ought also to be better fed than almost any troops in Europe.
Our regiments are composed of half our own people and half foreigners who enlist for money. The latter only wait for a favorable opportunity to quit a service to which they have no particular attachment. The prevention of desertion therefore becomes an object of importance.
Many of our generals regard one man as good in effect as another, and imagine that if the vacancy be filled up, this man has no influence on the whole; but one does not know how on this subject to make a proper application of other armies to our own.
If a deserter be replaced by a man as well trained and disciplined as himself, it is a matter of no consequence; but if a soldier who for two years has been accustomed to arms and military exercise should desert and be replaced by a bad subject or perhaps none at all, the consequence must prove eventually very material.
It has happened from the negligence of officers in this particular, that regiments have not only been lessened in number, but that they have also lost their reputation.
By accidents of this kind, the army becomes weakened at the very period when its completion is most essentially necessary, and unless the greatest attention be paid to this circumstance, you will lose the best of your forces, and never be able to recover yourself.
Though my country be well peopled, it is doubtful if many men are to be met with of the height of my soldiers: and supposing even that there was no want of them, could they be disciplined in an instant? It therefore becomes one of the most essential duties of generals who command armies or detachments, to prevent desertion. This is to be effected.
An army is composed for the most part of idle and inactive men, and unless the general has a constant eye upon them and obliges them to do their duty, this artificial machine, which with greatest care cannot be made perfect, will very soon fall to pieces, and nothing but the bare idea of a disciplined army will remain.
Constant employment for the troops is therefore indispensably necessary. The experience of officers who adopt such a plan will convince them of its good effects, and they will also perceive that there are daily abuses to be corrected, which pass unobserved by those who are too indolent to endeavor to discover them.
This constant and painful attention may appear at first sight as rather a hardship on the general, but its consequences will make him ample amends. With troops so fine, so brave, and so well disciplined, what advantage can he not obtain? A general, who with other nations would be regarded as being rash or half mad, would with us be only acting by established rules. Any enterprise which man is capable of executing may be undertaken by him. Besides this, the soldiers will not suffer a man to remain amongst them who has betrayed any symptoms of shyness, which would certainly not be tolerated in other armies.
I have been an eyewitness to the conduct both of officers and private soldiers, who could not be prevailed on, though dangerously wounded, to quit their post or fall into the rear to get themselves dressed. With troops like these, the world itself might be subdued, if conquests were not as fatal to the victors as to the vanquished. Let them be but well supplied with provisions, and you may attempt anything with them. On a march, you prevent the enemy by speed; at an attack of a wood, you will force them; if you make them climb a mountain, you will soon disperse those who make any resistance, and it then becomes an absolute massacre. If you put your cavalry into action, they will charge through the enemy at the sword's point, and demolish them.
But as it is not alone sufficient that the troops be good and as the ignorance of a general may be the means of losing every advantage, I shall proceed to speak of the qualities which a general ought to possess and lay down such rules as I have either learned from well-informed generals or purchased dearly by my own experience.
Of the Subsistence of Troops and of Provisions
It has been said by a certain general that the first object in the establishment of an army ought to be the making provision for the belly, that being the basis and foundation of all operations. I shall divide this subject into two parts: in the first, I shall explain how and where magazines ought to be established, and in the latter, the method of employing and of transporting them.
The first rule is to establish the large magazines invariably in the rear of the army and, if possible, in a place that is well secured. During the wars in Silesia and Bohemia, our grand magazine was at Breslau on account of the advantage of being able to replenish it by means of the Oder. When magazines are formed at the head of an army, the first check may oblige you to abandon them, and you may be left without resource, whereas, if they are established in the rear of each other, the war will be prudently carried on, and one small disaster will not complete your ruin.
Spandau and Magdeburg should be the chosen situations for magazines in the frontier of the Electorate. Magdeburg, on account of the Elbe, will be particularly serviceable in an offensive war against Saxony, and Schweidnitz against Bohemia.
You cannot be too cautious in the choice of commissaries and their deputies, for if they prove dishonest, the state will be materially injured. With this view, men of strict honor should be appointed as superiors, who must personally, frequently, and minutely examine and control the accounts.
There are two ways of forming magazines, either by ordering the nobility and peasants to bring their grain to the depot, and paying them for it according to the rate laid down by the chamber of finance, or by taking a certain quantity from them by requisition. It is the business of the commissary to settle and to sign all these agreements.
Purveyors are never to be employed but in cases of the last necessity, for even Jews are less exorbitant in their demands. They increase the price of provisions, and sell them out again at a most extravagant profit.
The magazines should be established at a very early period, that no kind of necessary may be wanting when the army leaves its quarters to begin a campaign. If they be too long neglected, the frost will put a stop to water carriage, or the roads will become so excessively deep and heavy that their formation will be a business of the utmost difficulty.
Besides the regimental covered wagons which carry bread for eight days, the commissary is provided with conveniences for carrying provisions for a month.
The wagons should be drawn by horses: trial has been made of oxen, but they do not answer the purpose.
The wagon masters must be exceedingly careful tht due attention be paid to their animals. The general of an army must also have an eye to this circumstance, for the loss of horses will necessarily occasion a diminution of wagons, and consequently of provisions.
Moreover, unless they receive a proper quantity of good food, these horses will be unable to undergo the necessary fatigue. On a march, therefore, not only the horses will be lost but also the wagons and their contents. The best concerted measures may be ruined by...such disasters. The general, therefore, must not neglect any of these circumstances which are so materially important in all his operations.
Vessels of a particular construction are built for the purpose of conveying corn and forage along the canals and rivers. The advantage of navigation is, however, never to be neglected, for without this convenience, no army can ever be abundantly supplied....
Besides the covered wagons which carry provisions, iron ovens always travel with the army (the number of which has of late been very much augmented), and on every halting day they are set at work to bake bread. On all expeditions, you should be supplied with bread or biscuit for ten days. Biscuit is a very good article, but our soldiers like it only in soup, nor do they know how to employ it to the best advantage....
I have provided handmills for each company, which are found to be exceedingly useful, as they are worked by the soldiers, who carry the meal to the depot and receive bread in return. With this meal, you are enabled to husband your magazines and have it in your power to remain much longer in camp than you could without such supply. Moreover, fewer convoys and a smaller number of escorts will also be found sufficient.
On the subject of convoys, I must enlarge a little. The strength of escorts depends on the fear which you entertain of the enemy. Detachments of infantry are sent into the towns through which the convoys pass, to afford them a point of support. Large detachments to cover them are sometimes sent out, as was the case in Bohemia.
In all chequered countries, convoys should be escorted by the infantry to which a few hussars may be added, in order to keep a lookout on the march and inform themselves of all situations where the enemy may lie concealed.
My escorts have been formed of infantry in preference to cavalry even in a plain country, and in my own opinion with very much advantage.
For what regards the minutiae of escorts, I refer you to my military regulation. The general of an army cannot be too anxious about the security of his convoys.
One good rule to attain this end is to send troops forward for the purpose of occupying the defiles through which the convoy is to pass and to push the escort a league in front towards the enemy. By this maneuver the convoys are masked, and arrive in security.
Of Sutlers, Beer, and Brandy
When you have it in contemplation to make any enterprise on the enemy, the commissary must be ordered to get together all the beer and brandy that he can lay his hands on, that the army may not want these articles, at least for the first days. As soon as the army enters an enemy's country, all the brewers and distillers who are in the neighborhood must immediately be put in requisition. The distillers, in particular, must be instantly set to work, that the soldier may not lose his dram, which he can very badly spare.
Protection must be afforded to the sutlers, especially in a country whose inhabitants are fled, and where provisions cannot be had for money. At such a time, we are justified in not being over nice with respect to the peasantry.
The sutlers and women must be sent out in search of vegetables and cattle. The price of provisions is, however, a matter that requires much attention, as the soldier ought to be allowed to purchase at a reasonable price, and at the same time the sutler should derive an honest profit.
It may be added that the soldier receives gratis during a campaign two pounds of bread per day and two pounds of flesh per week. It is an indulgence which the poor fellows richly deserve, especially in Bohemia, where the country is but little better than a desert.
Convoys for the army should ever be followed by herds of cattle, for the support and nourishment of the soldier....
Of the Knowledge of a Country
The knowledge of a country is to be attained in two ways: the first (and that with which we ought to begin) is by a careful and studious examination of a map of the country which is intended to be the scene of war and by marking on it very distinctly the names of all the rivers, towns, and mountains that are of any consequence.
Having by this means gained a general idea of the country, we must proceed to a more particular and minute examination of it, to inform ourselves of the directions of the high roads, the situation of the towns, whether by a little trouble they can be made tenable, on what side to attack them if they are possessed by the enemy, and what number of troops are necessary for their defense.
We should also be provided with plans of the fortified towns, that we may be acquainted with their strength and what are their most assailable parts. The course and depth of the large rivers should also be ascertained, how far they are navigable, and if shallow enough at any points to allow of being forded. It should also be know what rivers are impassable in spring and dry in summer. This sort of inquiry must extend likewise to the marshes of any consequence that may be in the country.
In a flat, smooth country, the fertile parts should be distinguished from those that are not so, and we must be well acquainted with all the marches that either the enemy or ourselves can undertake, to pass from one great city or river to another. It will be necessary also to break up those camps, which are liable to be taken on that route.
A flat, open country can be reconnoitered presently, but the view is so confined in that which is woody and mountainous, that it becomes a business of much difficulty.
In order therefore to procure intelligence so highly important, we must ascend the heights, taking the map with us and also some of the elders of the neighboring villages, such as huntsmen and shepherds. If there be one mountain higher than another, that must be ascended, to gain an idea of a country which we wish to discover.
We must gain a knowledge of the roads, not only to be satisfied in how many columns we may march, but also that we may be enabled to plan a variety of projects, and be informed how we may reach the enemy's camp and force it, should any be established in the neighborhood, or how place ourselves on his flank, should he alter his position.
One of the most material objects is, to reconnoiter situations that, in case of necessity, may serve as camps of defense, as well as a field of battle, and the posts that may be occupied by the enemy.
A just idea must be formed of all these matters of intelligence, as well as of the most considerable posts, the valleys, chief defiles, and all the advantageous situations which the country affords; and we must seriously reflect on every operation that may take place, so that by being prepared beforehand with a plan of arrangements, we may not be embarrassed when called into action.
These reflections should be well connected, and maturely digested, with all the care and patience that an object of so much consequence requires, and unless we can arrange the matter to our satisfaction the first time, we must try it over again and again until we have got it perfect.
It is a general rule in the choice of all camps, whether for offense or defense, that both wood and water be near at hand, that the front be close and well covered, and the rear perfectly open.
If circumstances forbid the examination of a country in the manner laid down, clever, intelligent officers should be sent thither under any kind of excuse, or even in disguise if necessary. They are to be well informed of the nature of the observations which they are to make, and at their return, the remarks which they have made on the camps and different situations are to be noted on a map; but when we can make use of our own eyes, we ought never to trust to those of other people.
Of the Coup d'Oeil
The coup d'oeil may be reduced, properly speaking, to two points: the first of which is, the having abilities to judge how many troops a certain extent of country can contain. This talent can only be acquired by practice, for after having laid out several camps, the eye will gain so exact an idea of speace, that you will seldom make any material mistake in your calculations.
The other, and by far the most material point, is to be able to distinguish at first sight all the advantages of which any given space of ground is capable. This art is to be acquired, and even brought to perfection, though a man be not absolutely born with a military genius.
Fortification, as it possesses rules that are applicable to all situations of an army, is undoubtedly the basis and foundation of this coup d'oeil. Every defile, marsh, hollow way, and even the smallest eminence will be converted by a skillful general, to some advantage.
Two hundred different positions may sometimes be taken up in the space of two square leagues of which an intelligent general knows how to select that which is the most advantageous. In the first place, he will ascend even the smallest eminences to discover and reconnoiter the ground; and assisted by the same rules of fortification, he will be enabled to find out the weak part of the enemy's order of battle. If time permits, the general would do well to pace over the ground, when he has determined on his general position.
Many other advantages may also be derived from the same rules of fortification, such as the manner of occupying heights and how to choose them that they may not be commanded by others; in what manner the wings are to be supported that the flanks may be well covered; how to take up positions that may be defended and avoid those which a man of reputation cannot without great risk maintain. These rules will also enable him to discover where the enemy is weakest, either by having taken an unfavorable position, distributed his force without judgment, or from the slender means of defense which he derives from his situation. I am led by these reflections to explain in what manner troops ought to be distributed so as to make the most of their ground.
Of the Distribution of Troops
Though the knowledge and choice of ground are very essential points, it is of no less importance that we know how to profit by such advantages, so that the troops may be placed in situations that are proper and convenient for them.
Our cavalry, being designed to act with velocity, can only be made use of on a plain, whereas the infantry may be employed in every possible variety of ground. Their fire is for defense, and their bayonet for attack.
We always begin by the defensive, as much caution is necessary for the security of a camp, where the vicinity of the enemy may at any moment bring on an engagement.
The greater part of the orders of battle now existing are of ancient date. We tread in the steps of our ancestors without regulating matters according to the nature of the ground, and hence it is that a false and erroneous application so often takes place.
The whole of an army should be placed in order of battle agreeably to the nature of ground which every particular part of it requires. The plain is chosen for the cavalry, but this is not all which regards them; for if the plain be only a thousand yards in front, and bounded by a wood in which we suppose the enemy to have thrown some infantry, under whose fire their cavalry can rally, it will then become necessary to change the disposition, and place the infantry at the extremities of the wings that the cavalry may receive the benefit of their support.
The whole of the cavalry is sometimes placed on one of the wings, or in the second line: at other times their wings are closed by one or two brigades of infantry.
Eminences, church yards, hollow ways, and wide ditches are the most advantageous situations for an army. If in the disposition of our troops we know how to take advantage of these circumstances, we never need to fear being attacked.
If your cavalry be posted with a morass in its front, it is impossible that it can render you any service, and if it be placed too near a wood, the enemy may have troops there, who may throw them into disorder and pick them off with their muskets, while they are deprived of every possible means of defense. Your infantry will be exposed to the same inconveniences if they are advanced too far on a plain with their flanks not secured, for the enemy will certainly take advantage of such error, and make their attack on that side where they are unprotected.
The nature of the ground must invariably be our rule of direction. In a mountainous country, I should place my cavalry in the second line and never use them in the first line except they could act to advantage, unless it be a few squadrons to fall on the flank of the enemy's infantry who may be advancing to attack me.
It is a general rule in all well-disciplined armies that a reserve of cavalry be formed if we are on a plain; but where the country is chequered and intersected, this reserve is formed of infantry with the addition of some hussars and dragoons.
The great art of distributing troops on the field is so to place them that all have room to act and be uniformly useful. Villeroi, who perhaps was not well acquainted with this rule, deprived himself of the assistance of the whole of his left wing on the plain of Ramillies, by having posted them behind a morass, where it was morally impossible that they could maneuver, or render any sort of support to his right wing....
Of Our Own Country and That Which Is Either Neutral or Hostile; of the Variety of Religions and of the Different Conduct Which Such Circumstances Require
War may be carried on in three different kinds of country: either in our own territories, those belonging to neutral powers, or in the country of an enemy.
If glory were my only object, I would never make war but in mine own country, by reason of its manifold advantages, as every man there acts as a spy, nor can the enemy stir a foot without being betrayed.
Detachments of any strength may boldly be sent out, and may practice in safety all the maneuvers of which war is capable.
If the enemy have the disadvantage, every peasant turns soldier and lends a hand to annoy him as was experienced by the Elector Frederick William after the battle of Fehrbellin, where a greater number of Swedes was destroyed by the peasants than fell in the engagement. After the battle of Hohen-Friedberg, also I observed that the mountaineers in Silesia brought in to us the runaway Austrians in great abundance.
When war is carried on in a neutral country, the advantage seems to be equal, and the object of attention then is to rival the enemy in the confidence and friendship of the inhabitants. To attain this end, the most exact discipline must be observed, marauding and every kind of plunder strictly forbidden, and its commission punished with exemplary severity. It may not be amiss also to accuse the enemy of harboring some pernicious designs against the country.
If we are in a Protestant country, we wear the mark of protector of the Lutheran religion and endeavor to make fanatics of the lower order of people, whose simplicity is not proof against our artifice.
In a Catholic country, we preach up toleration and moderation, constantly abusing the priests as the cause of all the animosity that exists between the different sectaries, although, in spite of their disputes, they all agree upon material points of faith.
The strength of the parties you may be required to send out must depend on the confidence that can be placed in the inhabitants of the country. In our country you may run every risk, but more caution and circumspection are necessary in a neural country, at least till you are convinced of the friendly disposition of the whole, or the greatest part of the peasantry.
In a country that is entirely hostile, as Bohemia and Moravia, you are to hazard nothing, and never send out parties, for the reasons already mentioned, as the people there are not to be trusted any farther than you can see them. The greater part of the light troops are to be employed in guarding the convoys, for you are never to expect to gain the affection of the inhabitants of this country. The Hussites in the circle of Konigingraetz are the only people that can be induced to render us any sort of service. The men of consequence there, though seemingly well-disposed toward us, are arrant traitors, nor are the priests or magistrates at all better. As their interest is attached to that of the House of Austria, whose views do not altogether clash with ours, we neither ought or can repose any sort of confidence in them.
All that now remains for our management is fanaticism, to know how to inspire a nation with zeal for the liberty of religion and hint to them in a guarded manner how much they are oppressed by their great men and priests. This may be said, to be moving heaven and hell for one's interest.
Since these notes have been put together, the Empress Queen has materially increased the taxes in Bohemia and Moravia: advantage may be taken of this circumstance to gain the goodwill of the people, especially if we flatter them that they shall be better treated if we become masters of the country....
To Officers
Many people wish to command and fancy themselves equal to the undertaking without knowing if they possess a necessary share of experience and of the other requisites, and without having learned to be commanded themselves.
This circumstance obtains particularly in the military life, and especially amongst young officers. But if they knew that very often the fault of a moment or even the slightest mistake may destroy a reputation gained by years of trouble and fatigue, and especially that during a campaign, such faults are irremediable, and punishment their natural consequence, they would certainly be more anxious to obtain such knowledge than to be placed in situations that demand its practice without their having acquired it. Experience and good conduct will lead to honor, while every other path tends to error and mistake.
The obedience and subordination to which youth for a certain time are subject subdue the passions peculiar to that age. Hence danger becomes familiar to the soldier, and he is rendered intrepid and capable of forming at a moment any resolution which circumstances may require; by this means also he becomes inured to the fatigues of war and takes delight in his profession, convinced that his advancement therein depends upon it. Through this, the officer also learns to be acquainted with the individuals whom he is one day to command, and by gaining their esteem and confidence, ensures the prompt and zealous execution of his orders. Every officer should bear in mind that the true point of honor alone may prove the foundation of his fortune. He should therefore constantly regard it as the main spring of all his actions and be fully persuaded that it is the only road by which he can arrive at those honorable distinctions which are the just reward of real desert. The true point of honor will ever induce him not only to avoid all imputation of blame but also to endeavor to procure esteem by his own personal merit. It is this which will convince him that it is not only necessary to signalize himself when an occasion offers, but that it is the duty of every intelligent officer to search and be on the lookout for such opportunity.
It should also be his particular study to observe and make himself well acquainted with all the proceedings and schemes which may have been conceived by the enemy, or are likely so to be, that he may be able to frustrate or destroy them, seize a favorable moment for attack, weaken or disturb them as circumstances may allow. Of this one maxim he ought never to lose sight--that much zeal is necessary in the execution of every enterprise and that there is always some attendant risk.
Grounded in these principles, he will avoid placing too much confidence in his own strength or knowledge and consider that he can undertake or perform nothing without the assistance of his comrades, whose duty it is to support him on all occasions. It therefore becomes very essential that he endeavor to know them and be capable of judging the extent of each individual's capacity in his profession. He should also court the confidence and friendship of valuable men, especially among those who are under his own command, and be able to distinguish the particular kind of service for which each man seems adapted; for example, some hussars are very clever at reconnoitering an enemy, who know nothing of reconnoitering a country; and again, others may perform this last service very well, though unable from some bodily infirmity to execute the former, as in this case, it often happens that many succeeding nights are of necessity passed under the canopy of heaven or in a wood. There are also those who conduct themselves much better on patrols or skirmishing parties than in a regular action.
All that has been said respecting the private soldier applies with equal force and justice to the officer. If in any affair he knows how to conduct himself agreeably to the dispositions of the people under him, the execution of it will be more easy, pleasant, and certain. There are in every squadron some old cunning troopers, who can often furnish excellent ideas, and make very valuable discoveries, if an opportunity be allowed them. With such, therefore, an officer would do well to converse, as he will not only derive instruction from their communications but also secure the friendship and confidence of the private soldier, which, in all expeditions, may prove of the highest advantage.
Moreover, he should endeavor to distinguish the courageous soldier from him who is less so, that he may know on an emergency whom to select. The good soldier should be particularly noticed, and his every want supplied. By this means, he becomes attached to his officer, who will be sure to reap glory and honor from his services. The weak and inexperienced men should also be encouraged, who will sometimes in consequence attempt such actions as appear at first sight to be dictated by rashness.
No officer should propose to himself a certain degree of rank which is to terminate his career, for he will then spare no pains and neglect no means to gain his point; and if he cannot pretend to it on the score of abilities, he will have recourse to powerful interest, which supplies his defect of merit, and procures for him the situation which he wishes. Hence we often see officers, who for a certain time are at infinite and almost incredible pains, as soon as they attain the object of their pursuit, fall off, and go through their duty with the greatest imaginable indifference. No justness or choice influences the actions and orders of such officers, and as they depend entirely on chance, their reputation, of consequence, frequently falls a sacrifice. Nothing is more certain than that the man who enters the service from any other motive than that of honor, if he seek riches or his own personal interest, will become a prey to avarice or some other despicable passion, which will render him an object of hatred and contempt.
Nothing injures an officer more in the opinion of a soldier than the suspicion of fraud. This is often induced by a passion for gambling, the fatal consequences of which too often extend much farther. His money had much better be expended in the purchase of good arms or good horses on which the life and reputation of a man so often depend.
An officer should possess an equal share of sobriety and reserve. With these two qualities, he will not only save his purse from unnecessary drains, but be always ready and disposed to do his duty whenever called upon. He should regard himself as a model for those beneath him, who are generally sufficiently ready in copying their superiors. Should an officer, in particular, be addicted to drinking or any vice of that nature, the soldier, who readily perceives it, will certainly not endeavor to correct it in himself, and will think it very hard to be rebuked for it, nor can the officer expostulate with him on the business without signing his own condemnation. The true foundation and groundwork of a good officer is a virtuous irreproachable conduct, not merely superficial, but serving as a guide to all his actions, for nothing can be more contradictory to real valor than an embarrassed conscience.
On the Conduct of an Officer Who Is Ordered to Put a Country under Contribution
It is to be supposed that when an officer is sent to put a country under contribution or to procure provisions for the army that the country is quite free of the enemy.
Under these circumstances, the general will give him all the orders and means that are necessary to the execution of his commission, as it is seldom left to an officer to receive on his own account the contributions of a whole country. He is in general only charged to make good the requisites to the general by means of hostages, threats, or even force. So that as long as the country in question refuse not the contribution demanded, it is by no means to be distrained on; and the officer must keep his people in perfect good order, forbidding the least excess and ordering them to be content with common fare both for themselves and their horses. By these means, he will the more easily accomplish his end, and the inhabitants will be better able to comply with his demands, than if tormented by too much teasing or pecuniary extortion.
On these occasions, the officer should never suffer his private interest to render him forgetful of the object of his mission, viz. the welfare of the whole army. Moreover, he must remain with his detachment till ordered by the general to remove or till the inhabitants have furnished the necessaries demanded.
Besides this, he ought not to neglect his personal safety, as it is very easy to imagine that he stands in some danger from people who are obliged to come down largely. The peasants, while they are supposed to be employed in getting their goods together, will use every means to rid themselves of their guests, and inform the nearest enemy of what is going forward, that by their arrival the project may be defeated, and their property preserved. In this case, the officer will do well to keep patrols constantly moving round the villages under contribution, which are situated near the enemy, to gain from them certain intelligence of their appearance, whether they be still or in motion, and if any reinforcements arrive. According to these circumstances, he must regulate his conduct, either hastening the contributions or allowing more time to the inhabitants, without proceeding to extremities. He should report to the general every motion or change of the enemy, so that if it be their object to prevent the contribution, measures may be taken accordingly and another detachment sent to his support. Thus situated, he will be able to accomplish his purpose. In a word, every part of his duty must be strictly attended to and executed with the utmost exactness.
There still remains a case, where an officer may be ordered to levy a contribution on a country which is not absolutely occupied by the enemy, but rendered suspicious by patrols or continual detachments.
This only happens when the country in front is unfavorable for him, but convenient for the enemy to halt and pay troublesome visits. For this reason, every means should be used to prevent the enemy from tarrying there and exerting themselves to rob us of the necessaries of which we stand in need. It is also possible that a party may want provisions or may have received express orders from the king to raise contributions in a country, for punishment or some other reason. In both cases, the officer will be obliged to enable him to gain his point, to make arrangements totally different from those which he would employ, if he had no enemy to fear or if they were at such a distance as not to disturb him in his expedition.
To ensure success, it will therefore be necessary for him to have a perfect knowledge of the country. He should also be informed, if the enemy come thither with whole detachments, or only send frequent patrols, how they behave to the inhabitants, whether by pillage or any other outrage they render themselves disagreeable. He must also endeavor to make the people his friends, that he may gain intelligence relating to the enemy.
To give some security to his patrols, he should know whither and into what villages the enemy have been most accustomed to send patrols, of what force, what route they take, the moment of their arrival and departure, at what distance the troops are that furnish the patrols, and, in short, whether the country be hilly, swampy, or intersected by small woods or any other objects. To learn these particulars, he should be furnished with an intelligent spy and an accurate map of the country.
As expeditions of this nature will not allow an officer to divide his people without great risk, he had better attempt his march in form of patrols with an advanced and rear guard and flank patrols, endeavoring nevertheless to conceal himself as much as possible. He must consequently instruct his people that on the least discovery of the enemy they are to halt and inform him of it, that he may take another road. But if he be so lucky as to gain the village unperceived, he must not go directly into it, but halt in the nearest copses or valleys. From thence, he should detach one or two trusty noncommissioned officers with six or eight men into the villages which are not occupied by the enemy and which are nearer to the army than that where he is posted. In general, it is necessary that the greatest prudence be observed, unless the officer chooses to return empty handed, or run the risk of being carried off.
But in order to gain his point, the officer and noncommissioned officers (who will have received their instructions beforehand) should so place their advanced guards that they may discover everything on the side of the enemy, not neglecting to send forward frequent patrols. They must, however, avoid every village, marching in such a way as to conceal themselves, and still observe everything. The officer should remain with his detachment without the village which is to contribute, in a copse or some covered place, shifting his position as often as he shall find necessary, to prevent being found by the enemy, from a deserter, or by any other means. He must, however, never change his post without informing his people, who are out, where they may find him. The noncommissioned officers commanding the detached posts should also be informed of the place of assembly in case of being surprised by the enemy.
These precautions being observed, the officer must send some men into the village, who are to bring back with them the magistrate and other chief inhabitants. But to prevent their seeing the strength of his detachment, he should order one party to fall back into the wood, that he may appear in more force than he really is. He must acquaint these inhabitants what they are to deliver, and by what time. They will, of course, make all the difficulties and remonstrances possible, in order to gain time and delay the delivery. But as these situations will not allow of much parley, he must explain himself to them very seriously, detain the most wealthy of them, and send the rest back to the village, threatening to set fire to it at the four corners, if the requisition be not delivered by the time appointed.
The advanced guards and patrols must take good care that while the contribution is raising, no person goes from the village toward the enemy, and lay hold of every one they meet who wishes to pass.
As soon as the requisition is got together, it is to be loaded on wagons, and sent away by night in charge of a noncommissioned officer and a few men. The officer also will follow by the same route given them for the army, having obtained a certificate from the inhabitants, to produce to the general and prove that everything has been done for the good of the service. All the noncommissioned officers also, who may be detached in other villages, must behave in like manner, receiving certificates of what has been delivered, to prevent any excess being committed, either by themselves or their people.
The officer may also take with him some of the inhabitants to attest the good behavior of the party. When the different deliveries are made, the parties must acquaint each other of their departure, and every party is to be charged with the covering of the wagons that are in front of it, till they all arrive at the army....
On the Military Coup d'Oeil
According to the chevalier Folard's system, the knowledge of the nature and qualities of a country which is the theater of war is a science to be acquired. It is the perfection of that art to learn at one just and determined view the benefits and disadvantages of a country where posts are to be placed and how to act to the annoyance of the enemy. This is, in a word, the true meaning of a coup d'oeil without which an officer may commit errors of the greatest consequence. In short, without this knowledge, success cannot be promised in any enterprise, as the business of war requires much practice and experience to be well understood. To learn this before we begin a campaign, and, when engaged in it, to be able to join practice to theory, is the business of every good officer.
But as we are not always at war, as the army is not always campaigning, and the regiments only assemble at certain periods for exercise, we must endeavor to improve ourselves by means of our own genius and imagination, so as to learn, even in time of peace, a science so useful and necessary.
In the opinion of the chevalier Folard, field diversions are the best calculated to give a military coup d'oeil, for we not only learn from thence to distinguish the difference of countries, which never resemble each other, but we also get acquainted with a variety of stratagems, all of which have some connection with the business of war. One of the great advantages which we derive from hunting, is the knowledge of different countries, which gives us a coup d'oeil almost imperceptibly, which a little reflection and practice will soon make perfect.
Besides hunting by which but few people have an opportunity to profit, travels and walks have their advantages.
While traveling, we can look with a penetrating eye over all the country that we pass, figure to ourselves an enemy's post at whatever distance we please, conceive ourselves on another, judge of all the benefits and disadvantages peculiar to each party, arrange in imagination the plan of attack and defense of our own post; and as the unceasing variation of country offers incessantly new discoveries, an imagination a little warmed will never want employment.
While walking, the eye may judge and measure the distance of one place or thing from another; and to be certain that we are not mistaking, we can walk it over and convince ourselves of the justness of our coup d'oeil.
Every country will furnish an officer, who wishes for instruction, with the means of exercising his eyes and ideas. While he who engages in the profession from necessity without any taste will let slip the most happy opportunities of improving himself without turning them to any advantage.
T. Foster, translator. Military Instructions from the Late King of Prussia to His Generals and Particular Instruction to the Officers of His Army. (London: 1797).