New York Campaign
General McClure, USA

Genesee, New York, 1 January 1814

The late descent of the enemy on our frontier, and the horrid outrages committed on our defenceless inhabitants by the British allies, being laid to my misconduct as commanding officer of the American forces on the frontier, and although my conduct has been approved by the Secretary of War, the commander in chief of this state, and by general Harrison, before his departure, still I deem it a duty which I owe to my own reputation, in order to put a stop to the evil reports which are propagated against me, without knowing my orders, or the means which I had in my power to execute them, to give a brief statement of my most prominent acts since I have had the honour of so important a command. On my arrival at Fort George, and previous to the departure of general Wilkinson with his army from that post, I suggested to the general the necessity of marching out against the enemy at Cross Roads and Four Mile Creek; that his army, with the addition of my militia, were sufficient to take or destroy all the British forces in that neighbourhood, which would leave nothing more for the militia to do than to protect and keep in order the inhabitants of that part of the province, as otherwise our frontier would be liable to be invaded. This proposition, however, was not agreed to, as the general's instructions were of a different nature. The general left with me colonel Scott and 800 regulars, who were to remain until I considered my force sufficient to hold the fort without them, when they were to march to Sackett's Harbour.

About the 12th of October, the British army commenced their retreat towards the head of the lake. I issued orders for my militia to pursue, which was promptly obeyed. We advanced as far as the Twelve Mile Creek, and within a short distance of the enemy's rear guard, when colonel Scott sent an express, requesting me to return, and said that he would abandon the fort next day, and march with his troops for Sackett's Harbour; and at the same time detained my provisions and ammunition wagons, which compelled me to abandon the further pursuit of the enemy, and induced them to make a stand on the heights of Burlington. I was then left with about 1000 effective militia in Fort George, and 250 Indians, a force not more than sufficient to garrison the post. On the arrival of general Harrison's army, I was elated with the lington, taking possession of that post, and giving peace to the Upper Province and our frontier. We were prepared to march in 24 hours, when the arrival of commodore Chauncey with orders for that excellent officer, general Harrison, to repair immediately with his army to Sackett's Harbour, frustrated it. I remonstrated against his going off, as will be seen in a correspondence between the general and myself; but in vain. By this movement all my expectations were blasted, and I foresaw the consequences, unless a reinforcement was immediately sent on to supply the place of the drafted militia whose term of service would shortly expire. I considered my force, which had become ungovernable, as then insufficient to go against the enemy. The object of the last expedition to the Twenty Mile Creek, is fully explained in the general order which I issued on my return. For six weeks before the militia were discharged, I wrote, and continued writing, to the Secretary of War, the necessity of sending on a detachment of militia or regular troops; that I found it impossible to retain the militia in service one day beyond their term; I also stated, from the best information, the enemy's forces. I offered a bounty of two dollars per month, for one or two months, but without effect. Some few of colonel Bloom's regiment took the bounty, and immediately disappeared, and I was compelled to grant a discharge to the militia and volunteers, which left me about 60 effective regulars of the 24th United States infantry, under captain Rogers, to garrison Fort George. I summoned a council of the officers, and put the question-"Is the fort tenable with the present number of men?" They unanimously gave it as their opinion, that it would be madness in the extreme to pretend to hold it, and recommended its evacuation immediately, as the enemy's advance was then within eight miles. I accordingly gave orders for all the arms, ammunition and public stores, of every description, to be sent across the river, which was principally effected (though the enemy advanced so rapidly that ten of my men were made prisoners) and ordered the town of Newark to be burnt. This act, however distressing to the inhabitants and my feelings, was by order of the Secretary of War, and I believe at the same time proper. The inhabitants had twelve hours notice to remove their effects, and such as chose to come across the river were provided with all the necessaries of life. I left captain Leonard in the command of Fort Niagara, with about 160 effective regulars, and pointed out verbally, and particularly in a general order, how he should prepare for an attack, which would certainly take place. I stationed colonel Grieves's artillerists, consisting of about twenty men, with two pieces of artillery, at Lewiston, under the command of major Bennet, and made them a present of 400 dollars for volunteering their services three weeks; but before that place was attacked they nearly all deserted, except the officers, who bravely defended themselves, and cut their way through the savages. The Canadian volunteers, about 40 in number, under major Mallory, an officer of great merit, I stationed at Schlosser, and went myself to Buffalo to provide for the safety of that place, and Black Rock, which I trust is out of danger, having called out the militia of Niagara en masse.

The public are now in possession of some of the leading facts which have governed my conduct in the discharge of the trust assigned me, and I appeal to the candour of every dispassionate man to determine with what justice my feelings as a citizen, and pride as a soldier, have been wounded, and my character aspersed. If insubordination to the orders of superiors are justifiable, I may have failed in my defence. If to have suppressed the risings of mutiny is reprehensible, then also am I not justified. If to have enforced the disciplinary laws of a camp is a proceeding unwarranted, then have I been in error. But, fellow citizens, I do not think so meanly of you as to credit the monstrous supposition, that you will deliberately advocate such strange hypothesis. Your prejudices against me have been the result of feelings midled by the acts of my enemies, and not the result of your sober judgment, operating upon facts and principles. Those facts are now before you. On those facts judge me in your candour, and I will abide your decision.

John Brannan, ed. Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15 With Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of that Period. (Washington: 1823), pp. 290-292.